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ABSTRACT 
In both the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategy, the White House published 
President Barack Obama’s remarks emphasizing that the United States must integrate all 
the tools of national power to further U.S. strategic interests. This is especially true in a 
dynamic and increasingly multipolar world. In what this thesis calls the Next Great 
Game, the future key players in this emerging geopolitical scenario are Iran, Russia, 
China, and India. This thesis focuses on India. 
Using Joseph Nye’s concept of hard power and soft power, this thesis explores 
what bonds can and do serve to align the United States and India. In doing so, this thesis 
makes it clear that the United States and India share several soft power bonds as a result 
of their respective historic connections to British colonialism, which to a certain degree 
has already set the conditions for the integration of all the tools of U.S. national power 
with India. Though historic disagreements and complex regional relations stymie the 
process, the United States must be cognizant of the type of relationship that is presenting 
itself and understand that the tools of government may be less important than the form of 
power being exercised.  
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I. THE FUTURE OF GEOPOLITICS 
Currently, there seems to be a geopolitical power shift underway, a tectonic shift 
away from a world overshadowed by the United States and its Western allies and toward 
a multipolar world in which all the revised or emergent geopolitical actors reside in 
Eurasia. This shift away from the established powers of the West has been discussed and 
explored widely.1 Though the game at hand is similar to the Nineteenth Century contest 
between the British Empire and Czarist Russia, known as the “Great Game,” this thesis 
uses the term the Next Great Game to describe the new multilateral contest and its key 
players (the latter is discussed later in this chapter) that is emerging with Eurasia as the 
primary focus or pivot. Though superficially similar to the “Great Game,” the Next Great 
Game will incorporate more key players and be much more complex. Therefore, if the 
United States wishes to play a role in Eurasia and beyond, it is vitally important to 
understand who the potential players in the Next Great Game are, what is its geographical 
extent, and what tools the United ’States has as its disposal to play the game. 
A. THE NEXT GREAT GAME: EURASIA 
The first step in exploring this issue is to examine the playing field in which the 
Next Great Game will be played. Alexander Cooley, author of Great Games, Local 
Rules, wrote in 2012 of a New Great Game, “a contest among the United States, Russia, 
and China for power and influence in Central Asia.” 2 Though his work is primarily 
focused on the actions of these nations from 2001 through 2011, it is useful for 
understanding where and why the future for international politics is shifting toward 
Eurasia. Another work written in 2010, Robert Kaplan’s Monsoon, also addresses this 
shift towards Eurasia, though Kaplan emphasizes that the future of United States’ power 
                                                 
1 For example, see Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul M. Kennedy, The Pivotal States: A New 
Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); Mark T. Berger, 
and Heloise Weber, Rethinking the Third World: International Development and World Politics (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
2 Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3. 
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is tied to its influence, or lack thereof, on the lands that border on the Indian Ocean.3 
Kaplan insists that global power is centered on the Indian Ocean, arguing that the ocean’s 
position (bordering Asia, Africa, and the Middle East) makes it a global crossroad able to 
influence areas that are top U.S. strategic concerns. While Cooley is focused on Central 
Asia, and Kaplan on south Asia, John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, written in 2001, shifts the focus to China and the nearby region. He describes an 
upcoming contest between a growing China and the United States as their competing 
interests will likely bring some amount of confrontation.4  
To complicate the issue, other authors warn that the next conflict will be played 
out in the Middle East due to Iranian aspirations for regional dominance.5 For example, 
in 2007, Ali Ansar wrote Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and 
the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East in which he argues that the United ’States has 
long known that Iranian aspirations were counter to U.S. strategic interests. He notes that 
despite this situation, the United States has offered little more than rhetoric to counter 
Iranian goals. Aside from the ongoing nuclear talks between the United States and Iran 
and the role of Iran in combating Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which are 
important topics but outside the scope of this thesis, long-standing issues between Iran 
and the United States are now coming to a head. Ansar argues, “We have leapt from 
containment to confrontation, from apparent disinterest to an urgent need to do 
something. Iran is not simply a problem, it’s the problem.”6  
While acknowledging the problem with Iran specifically and the Middle East 
generally, other authors argue that the United States ought to reallocate assets away from 
the Middle East specifically because it is a troubled area. While these issues can be 
                                                 
3 Robert Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: 
Random House, 2010). 
4 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2001), 360–411. 
5 See: Zbigniew Brzeziński, Robert M. Gates, and Suzanne Maloney, Iran: Time for a New Approach 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004); Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran 
Defies the West (New York: Regnery Publisher 2009); Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of 
American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2007). 
6 Ansari, Confronting Iran, 3. 
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largely attributed to the Global War on Terror (GWOT: a term that has since been 
dropped from the military lexicon), any further U.S. intervention in the region would 
likely only further deteriorate the situation. As Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson 
wrote in a 2015 Foreign Affairs article, “Washington needs to embrace the idea of 
establishing a healthier equilibrium in U.S.-Middle Eastern relations, one that involves a 
lighter management role for the United States.”7 They argue that any outcome that may 
come as a result of U.S. action will likely have unforeseen repercussions and be contorted 
against the best interests of the United States. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the 
United States to reallocate assets to an area that can have more positive results. 
Therefore, from the books above (among many others), it would appear that while 
small-scale conflicts that fall within the parameters of the GWOT will continue to occur 
for the foreseeable future, the United States must also recognize that a great geopolitical 
contest is beginning to take shape in Eurasia. Moreover, it is that contest (the Next Great 
Game) in which the United States must make preparations now to ensure its long-term 
national interests. By looking at the previously described works, in the Next Great Game, 
it appears that the key players are shaping up to be Iran, Russia, China, and India. In this 
next section, this thesis briefly looks at these key players to determine where the United 
States not only could benefit but more so where a partnership is most likely. 
B. THE NEXT GREAT GAME KEY PLAYERS: THE UNITED STATES AND 
INDIA 
Of the key players in the Next Great Game, this thesis argues that India may or 
may not be the most beneficial partner, though there are certainly benefits, but it is the 
most likely. This is due to a converging of geopolitical interests (which will be briefly 
addressed), but also due to the ability of U.S. soft power to prove effective given the high 
positive perception of the United States, relative to other states as seen in Figure 1, and 
also within India, as seen in Figure 2. This perception stems from common British ties 
                                                 
7 Steven Simon and Johnathon Stevenson, “The End of Pax American: Why Washington’s Middle 
East Pullback Makes Sense,” Foreign Affairs (November–December 2015). 
  4 
and the influence of Hollywood, both of which grants U.S. soft power a wealth of 
reserves within India.8 This topic is addressed further in the chapters to come. 
Figure 1.  Global Views of the United States 
 
Source: Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “America’s Global Image,” 
Pew Global, June 23, 2015, accessed August 3, 2015, www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/1-
americas-global-image/. 
                                                 
8 Rini Bhattacharya Mehta, and Rajeshwari V. Pandharipande, Bollywood and Globalization: Indian 
Popular Cinema, Nation, and Diaspora (New York: Anthem Press, 2010). 
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Figure 2.  Indian Global Perceptions 
 
Source: Bruce Stokes, “How Indians See the World,” Pew Global, September 17, 2015, 
accessed December 7, 2015, www.pewglobal.org/2015/09/17/the-modi-bounce/india-
report-05/. 
This is an obvious opportunity for the United States because if the nexus of the 
globe’s cross roads lie within the nations along the Indian Ocean, as presented by Kaplan, 
along with the fact that, as noted by other observers, Iran, Russia, and the Peoples’ 
Republic of China form a triangle of sorts to the north, then India’s sheer size and 
geographic location provides it with the resources to be of considerable influence in the 
region. Furthermore, this dominance is amplified by India’s growing influence in the 
region. India is the second most populous nation in the world with a population of 
roughly one billion people, second only to China, and has an active military of 1.32 
million members, third behind China (first) and the U.S. (second).9 While fears persist of 
China’s economic rise and projected 2030 date to surpass the U.S. economy, U.S. 
government reports project India will surpass the U.S. economy by around 2050.10 This 
dramatic rise has not gone unnoticed by U.S. policy makers. 
                                                 
9 James Hackett, The Military Balance 2012: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities 
and Defense Economics (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012). 
10 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (NIC 2012-001), 
(Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2012). 
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In 2010, President Barack Obama formally announced his intention to “Pivot to 
the Pacific” in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). Essentially under this plan, 
President Obama wanted to draw down U.S. involvement in the Central Command 
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility and increase U.S. influence into Pacific Command 
(PACOM).11 However, while the idea was well intended, its application has been stunted 
largely due to continued crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Regarding Asia, 
primary concerns for the United States are the growing influence of China, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the growth/spread of religious 
extremism, all of which are shared concerns with India. The issues in region are 
exacerbated by the over-militarization and economic disproportion that plague the Indo-
Asian Pacific. 12  The region contains seven of the top 10 largest active militaries, 
including three of the top four in the world, and also two of the three largest economies 
along with 10 of the 14 smallest.13 This disparity creates a scenario in which a rapidly 
emerging nation, such as China, can spread its influence in an attempt to upset the 
balance of power in the region. Also, states with weaker central governments, such as 
Indonesia, are finding themselves vulnerable to radical extremists who can use isolated 
areas for training and staging. These issues demand constant attention and frequent 
intervention, and often more than the United States can offer. Therefore, it would benefit 
the United States to have a trusted partner within the region who shares those same 
interests/concerns. 
In 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued guidance saying, “The United 
States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability 
                                                 
11 CENTCOM is consists of 20 countries, including the recent hot spots of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, and Egypt. For more information visit: www.centcom.mil. PACOM consists of 36 countries in the 
Asian-Pacific region. For more information visit: http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOM 
AreaofResponsibility.aspx. 
12 This term encompasses all the area from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Landmasses include 
India in the west to the Korean Peninsula in the northeast. The difference between Indo-Asian Pacific and 
Asia is that the former includes Australia and New Zealand but excludes nations that do not have ocean 
access. 
13 Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), accessed August 9, 2014, 
http://www.socpac.socom.mil/default.aspx; James Hackett, The Military Balance 2012: The Annual 
Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics (London: Routledge, 2012), 233–242. 
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to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian 
Ocean region.”14 In 2014, the Quadrennial Defense Review expanded this by stating, 
“The United States supports India’s rise as an increasingly capable actor in the region, 
and we are deepening our strategic partnership.” 15  While these statements sound 
promising, the question this thesis asks is: How? 
The first step in understanding how to improve current U.S.-Indo relations is to 
understand what obstacles have been carried over from the past. Over the past near 70 
years, relations between India and the United States have been filled with icy patches that 
are only now warming up. To understand better why this is so, a brief look into the 
history of U.S.-Indo relations follows.  
Freedom at Midnight, written by Collins and Lapierre in 1975, is one of the best 
works to describe the complexity and chaos surrounding Indian independence. 16 
Following the Indian Independence Act of 1947, fierce debate about how the new nation 
would be governed erupted within India’s interim government.17 Not only were political 
borders part of the debate, but everything from gold reserves to government office 
furniture needed to be divided as part of “the most complex divorce in history.”18  
Following its independence, India immediately fell into a complex five-way 
geopolitical relationship as described in Richard Siegel’s Evaluating the Results of 
Foreign Policy, written in 1969. Key influencers included: the United States, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China, and of course Pakistan. During the first few 
decades of India’s existence, nearly all geopolitical relations had to take into 
                                                 
14 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 2.  
15 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2014), 17.  
16 Dominique Lapierre, and Larry Collins, Freedom at Midnight (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1997).  
17 Ibid., 205–236. 
18 Lapierre, and Collins, Freedom at Midnight, 212. 
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consideration these five interested parties.19 The work India, Pakistan, and the Great 
Powers, by William Barnds in 1972, examines the relationships between the new nations 
of India and Pakistan and their relations to the great powers of the day. In this work, we 
see the divide between India and the United States start after the United States sided with 
Pakistan over the first Kashmir conflict of 1947, a divide which continued to grow 
throughout the Cold War.20  
Helping to grow the divide between the U.S. and India was Soviet interaction 
with India. In Soviet Policy towards India, by J. A. Naik in 1960, the author explains how 
the Soviets enticed India to align with the USSR during the Cold war.21 In this work, 
Naik explains that the Soviets fared much better and were able to influence India’s policy 
makers because the Soviet Union enjoyed a far better image in India than the United 
States. The Soviets were keen to capitalize on this perception to negotiate favorable 
treaties and agreements. The first Indo-Soviet agreement was signed on December 2, 
1953, and the most important facet of this agreement was not the goods traded but rather 
the terms. Traditional stipulations placed on India by Western nations were removed by 
the Soviets. These Western stipulations usually included that trade must be conducted in 
Western currency and that India’s imports must exceed its exports.22 The lifting of these 
handicaps sent a strong message to India that the Soviet Union saw India as a legitimate 
regional actor, rather than a lesser state. The message was well received and served to 
draw India closer to the Soviet Union. This is evidenced by the dramatic increase in trade 
between India and the Soviet Union during this period. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union 
represented less than one percent of all Indian exports, but that number had increased to 
                                                 
19 Richard L. Siegel, Evaluating the Results of Foreign Policy: Soviet and American Efforts in India, 
The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World 
Affairs, 6 (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1969). 
20 William Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 
257–348. 
21 J. A. Naik, Soviet Policy towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev (Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1970).  
22 Ibid., 163–168. 
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16 percent by 1965, making the Soviet Union the third most popular destination for 
Indian exports.23 
The 1960s and 1970s saw more conflict in the region, with armed conflicts 
involving India, Pakistan, China, and the formation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan. 
During the Pakistani civil war in 1971, in which the Indians were actively supporting 
East Pakistan, the United States sailed into the Bay of Bengal with a carrier led strike 
group. While the United States was seeking to quell the growing crisis, the Indians 
perceived this act as support for Pakistan in a form of Western gunboat diplomacy.24 As 
a result, as described in Douglas Borer’s 1999 work, Superpowers Defeated, both 
Afghanistan and India drew closer to the Soviet Union.25 In this book, it describes how 
the United States decided to strengthen its partnership with Pakistan after the newly 
formed communist regime in Afghanistan sought the help of the Soviet Union in 1979. 
Now, Pakistan was shaping up to be a key strategic ally against the Soviets in the Cold 
War. For the United States, the decision to provide military and economic aid to Pakistan 
was seen as vital to continue support to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan.26 However, this 
cooperation would further erode U.S. relations with India.  
Though India proclaimed to be “non-aligned” nation, it clearly leaned towards the 
Soviet Union during this period. These sentiments were reinforced when the United 
States openly condemned India for acquiring nuclear weapons, which India first 
successfully tested in 1974. This icy period is perhaps best described in a 1992 work by 
Dennis Kux titled, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies.27 Backed by the 
belief that the Soviet Union supported its actions, India was moving from a non-aligned 
                                                 
23 Naik, Soviet Policy towards India, 134. 
24 P. R. Chari, “Indo-US Relations: Non-proliferation Concerns,” in Engaging India: U.S. Strategic 
Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy, ed. Gary K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam 
Srivastava (London: Routledge, 1999), 3.  
25 Douglas A. Borer, Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared (Portland, OR: 
Frank Cass, 1999).  
26 Borer, Superpowers Defeated, 181–182. 
27 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991 (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1992). 
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to a pro-Soviet status in the international arena. However, once the Soviet Union fell in 
the late 1980s, India would feel isolated, having felt the sting of losing a key backer while 
remaining surrounded by regional threats.  
Engaging India is a leading work by Gary Bertsch from 1999 that examines the 
tense relations between the United States and India following the Cold War.28 A key area 
of tension, as also identified in 2009 by Dinshaw Mistry’s Complexity of Deterrence 
among New Nuclear States, were concerns over the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
subsequent sanctions placed by the United States objecting to India’s nuclear testing 
during another clash with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1998. 29  These sanctions would 
largely stay in place until 2008 and would play a significant role in the poor economic 
growth of India in the 1980s and 1990s. Relations between India and the United States 
would be further stressed when U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as part of the GWOT 
would necessitate closer cooperation between the United States and Pakistan as explained 
in Usama Butt and Julian Scholfield’s 2012 work, Pakistan: The U.S., Geopolitics and 
Grand Strategies.30   
From this brief look at history, it can be seen that the U.S.-Pak relationship has 
been instrumental to secure U.S. strategic objectives in the region and beyond. Recently, 
however, the United States and India have been drawn closer over shared interests, 
including concerns over growing Chinese influence within the region, and increased trade 
opportunities with each other; however, ongoing U.S. relations with Pakistan continue to 
complicate the diplomatic progress. Though this budding U.S.-Indo relationship does not 
need to come at the expense of the U.S.-Pak partnership, as the U.S.-Pak and U.S.-Indo 
relationships do not have to be a zero-sum game, as some U.S. policy makers may have 
                                                 
28 Gary Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, Engaging India: US Strategic Relations 
with the World’s Largest Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1999).  
29 Dinshaw Mistry, “Complexity of Deterrence among New Nuclear States,” in Complex Deterrence: 
Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009).  
30 Usama Butt, and Julian Schhofield, Pakistan: The U.S., Geopolitics and Grand Strategies (London: 
Pluto Press, 2012). 
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and may still believe.31 What it may take is a different approach. Though Pakistan has 
been critical to facilitate U.S. hard power and force projection, there are other forms of 
national power than can be useful to form alliances and align nations. The following 
section examines these methods in more detail. 
C. THE TOOLS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEXT 
GREAT GAME 
A leading realist author, Mearsheimer, presents his idea of “offensive realism” in 
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. According to realists, great powers, like Russia and 
China, are always looking for an opportunity to increase their power, especially relative 
to that of their rivals. By using “offensive realism,” the United States can seek out 
opportunities to use “calculated aggression” to prevent another great power from 
assuming enough power to gain an advantage over the United States. By using such 
methods as balancing and bandwagoning, the United States can form alliances with other 
great and lesser powers to challenge a rising power. 32  For instance, Mearsheimer 
suggests that a bandwagon with the United States could be used by India, Japan, 
Singapore, South Korea, Russia, or Vietnam to contain Chinese power.33 While these 
nations may not necessarily want to support the United States, it may still prove useful to 
them to be on the winning side of a confrontation with a great power. This theory is 
useful to form alliances, but given the sensitive relationship between India, Pakistan, and 
China, it may raise concerns. If the United States were to join an Indian bandwagon 
against one of the other nations stated, it would drastically shift the balance of power and 
possibly cause what Mearsheimer calls a “security competition.”34 This is where one 
nation perceives another nation’s change in security posture as a threat and then 
                                                 
31 P. R. Chari, “Indo-US Relations: Non-proliferation Concerns,” in Engaging India: U.S. Strategic 
Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy, ed. Gary K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam 
Srivastava (London: Routledge, 199), 3. 
32 For definitions and explanation of balancing and bandwagoning, see Mearshimer, The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics, 139. 
33 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 361–362. 
34 Ibid., 362. 
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subsequently increases its security measures. This in turn can be seen as a threat to other 
nations, who respond likewise, and the problem escalates.  
Another theory, proposed by authors such as Alexander Wendt, speaks about 
constructivism and a social theory of international politics. 35  According to 
constructivists, the structure of the international system is created by shared ideas, as 
much as or even more than by material goods. In this theory, social constructs are the key 
to creating connections. Contrary to realism, the drive for power and material goods is 
primarily the manifestation of social desires. Where nations share the same social desires, 
their interests will align. This concept is much better suited for the Next Great Game. 
Given the precarious nature of the relationships involved, the aligning of ideas can be 
useful to form partnerships without overtly endangering another state. The importance 
and relevance of these two theories (realism and constructivism) need to be remembered 
as we turn to a discussion of “soft power” propounded by Joseph Nye.  
According to Joseph Nye, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard University and Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration, 
power can be explored by focusing on two primary components: soft power and hard 
power. Soft power, as famously defined by Nye in his 1990 work Bound to Lead, is a 
national tool used to attract and persuade nation states to voluntarily align with another 
state.36 Therefore, soft power can be viewed as similar to the constructivist’s idea that 
geopolitical bonds are created by shared social constructs. Conversely, hard power, 
consisting of military and economic might, can be best described as the geopolitical 
equivalent of the “carrot and stick” approach and reflects the realists’ view of power. 
However, according to Nye, both hard power and soft power are useful to complement 
the other, forming “smart power,” as described in his 2004 work Soft Power.  
                                                 
35 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
36 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
1990). For other works by Nye about soft power see: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2004); The Powers to Lead (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); The 
Future of Power. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 
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To apply this theory to policy, let us examine the 2010 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) where President Barack Obama stressed the need to “integrate all of the tools of 
American power.”37 This was reinforced in the 2015 NSS, in which the president said, 
“We will lead with all the instruments of US power.”38 Following these remarks from the 
president, respectively, both the 2010 and 2015 NSS go on to identify numerous tools and 
instruments used to manipulate power. While these tools and instruments seemed to 
differ greatly, according to Nye, all these varying tools are being used to wield two basic 
forms of national power: hard power and soft power.39 This is important when attempting 
to integrate the tools, as it is more important to focus on the form of power being 
exercised rather than the tool. Of the two forms of power needed to generate smart 
power, arguably the most underestimated, or perhaps the most misunderstood, is soft 
power. 40  This is incredibly useful to understand when exploring potential strategic 
partnerships in the Next Great Game. 
For example, a U.S. relationship with Pakistan is vital to secure U.S. long-term 
interests and facilitate security within the region. For this reason, the United States cannot 
simply turn away from Pakistan in favor for India, as a zero-sum methodology would 
suggest. Instead, the United States can continue a hard power focused relationship with 
Pakistan while still improving relations with India through with a soft power centric 
approach. An example of U.S. soft power at work can be seen in the 2010 work by Mehta 
and Pandharipande, Bollywood and Globalization. In this book the authors explain how 
the influence of Hollywood was profound and proved essential in the creation of the 
Indian film industry known as Bollywood.41 This also created a market for U.S. goods as 
India had been viewing American movies for years, but the population was largely unable 
                                                 
37 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, 14. 
38 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, 4.  
39 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 
31.  
40 This argument will be addressed later in the chapter, in the section titled “Tools Available to the 
United States in the Next Great Game.”  
41 Mehta, and Pandharipande, Bollywood and Globalization.  
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to attain the goods they saw on the screen until after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
The effect of Hollywood created a fertile market for American made goods and as 
explained in Engaging India, Bertsch describes how the first interaction India had with 
the West after the fall was through American made goods and merchandise.42 As Indian 
markets opened to the United States, trade between the nations skyrocketed. As a result, 
U.S.-Indo trade dramatically rose from about $4.5 billion in 1988 to near $27 billion in 
2005.43 Just as Soviet soft power had increased trade with India in the 1960s, U.S. soft 
power has now granted the United States access to avenues to improve U.S.-Indo 
relations. This idea is developed further in the chapters to come. 
While small-scale conflicts from the GWOT and post-GWOT era are sure to 
entangle U.S. hard power assets for the foreseeable future, it is imperative for the United 
States to remain engaged and shape the Next Great Game. To these ends, soft power 
provides a means for the United States to still continue to improve relations with a strong 
regional actor, like India. Furthermore, soft power is precisely the right application of 
U.S. national power given the geopolitical situation that is currently between the 
neighboring states in Eurasia. However, while this chapter has briefly addressed how 
U.S. soft power can improve relations with India, it has not addressed why U.S. soft 
power can work. With this concept at its focus, this thesis uncovers what are fundamental 
elements for the current soft power bonds that are between India and the United States. 
To do this, this thesis first explores what soft power is and what are the conditions that 
favor its cultivation. Next, this thesis uncovers some of the common bonds between India 
and the United States that have contributed to the favorable cultivation of U.S. soft 
power. Lastly, this thesis concludes with final thoughts and recommendations. 
                                                 
42 Gary Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations 
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II. U.S. SOFT POWER AND THE NEXT GREAT GAME 
A farmer went out to plant some seeds. As he scattered them across his 
field, some seeds fell on a footpath, and the birds came and ate them. 
Other seeds fell on shallow soil with underlying rock. The seeds sprouted 
quickly because the soil was shallow. But the plants soon wilted under the 
hot sun, and since they didn’t have deep roots, they died. Other seeds fell 
among thorns that grew up and choked out the tender plants. Still other 
seeds fell on fertile soil, and they produced a crop that was thirty, sixty, 
and even a hundred times as much as had been planted!44  
As discussed in Chapter I, the Next Great Game is quickly taking shape. If the 
United States wishes to be a key player in the game, it must start now to use every means 
at its disposal to shape the playing field. In doing so, the United States must identify the 
key players and, more importantly, identify like-minded regional powerbrokers. 
The above parable provides a good analogy for soft power. In both cases, the 
seeds and soft power can be spread widely but will only thrive in an environment that is 
both receptive and conducive as far as actual results are concerned. In contrast, U.S. hard 
power resources are finite and must be allocated precisely. For the United States, it is 
thus beneficial to understand when and where the conditions are conducive to soft power 
to better know when and where to align other national assets to maximize on all the 
elements of power and influence an intended outcome. To do this, this chapter briefly 
discusses the different applications of soft power, hard power, and what Nye terms smart 
power, focusing on the composition of soft and hard power.45 Next, this chapter explores 
how to identify a receptive audience for the United States’ soft power and provides ways 
to identify when U.S. soft power is proving effective. 
                                                 
44 Matthew 13: 3-8.  
45 Joseph Nye, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs (July–August 2009), 
accessed Oct. 27, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart. See also: Joseph 
Nye, The Future of Power, Chapter 7 “Smart Power.” 
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A. SOFT POWER, HARD POWER, AND SMART POWER 
While soft power and hard power are both needed to complement the other—
forming smart power—how each is employed is drastically different. Hard power is 
rather universal in its application and understanding. While the threat of force may be 
received differently by various nation states, there is an understanding that certain 
decisions taken at their end could lead to a deadly military response by the geopolitical 
actor concerned. Similarly, economic sanctions to deter or punish a rogue nation can be 
put in place, and while they may not lead to deadly consequences, these sanctions are 
intended to cause some hardship. Both these measures are calculated efforts to cause 
“pain” with the anticipated goal of imposing one nation’s will over another; however, soft 
power is more free-floating and more difficult to quantify. It takes a certain sense of 
geopolitical nuance to know when it is working and how to apply it. Soft power is not an 
instrument that can be wielded or brought to bear against an adversary; however, it can be 
cultivated and capitalized upon by a savvy actor to amplify other national power 
instruments. Therefore, if the key to smart power is the proper application of hard power 
and soft power in concert, then knowing where soft power exists provides a possible 
venue for hard power to be used in a complementary fashion. This is an important first 
step in integrating all the tools of U.S. power as addressed in the NSSes mentioned in the 
preceding chapter. 
Nye explains that the key to applying soft power is its ability to attract other 
nations. In addition, he goes on to explain that the United States, as a powerful nation, 
has considerable soft power reserves because other nations want to be like the United 
States or at least be as powerful. The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030 
goes further, saying, “The economics of globalization have spread the West’s ideas of 
scientific reason, individualism, secular government, and primacy of law to societies 
seeking the West’s material progress.”46 Along with attraction, it therefore also becomes 
in other nations’ best interests to emulate and/or align with the United States in order to 
be successful. This is similar to the concept of “bandwagoning,” mentioned earlier. The 
                                                 
46 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends, 13. 
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main point here is that, alongside hard power considerations, the United States can take 
this concept and apply it using soft power. In the case for soft power bandwagoning, 
other nations will seek to emulate the United States to attract increased cooperation, 
believing that aligning with the United States will reap greater benefits as compared to 
bandwagoning with another power. For instance, if a nation wishes to conduct more trade 
with the United States, that nation could adopt some ideals that the United States would 
look upon favorably, such as implementing some type of internal change to appear more 
attractive to the United States.  
An example of this would be the actions of Mikhail Gorbachev in enacting 
Perestroika (restructuring), Glasnost (openness), Demokratizatsiya (democratization), and 
Uskoreniye (acceleration). These Soviet domestic actions were caused by a desire to keep 
pace with Western economies, as well as an attempt to address various other domestic 
issues. Gorbachev knew the Soviet system was failing, and he could also see that the 
United States was growing in wealth and power. Therefore, Gorbachev sought to reform 
more than just an economic system. Gorbachev was trying to enact such Western ideas as 
increased human rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of information to induce 
systematic changes in an effort to mimic Western success, while also attempting to make 
the Soviet Union more appealing for Western nations to work with. 47  This simple 
example illustrates that the sources of attraction can come from many sources, and in this 
way, it is impossible to unravel hard power and soft power from smart power. Though, 
the fact the act is voluntary is crucial when considering the Next Great Game, as any 
overt external pressure from the United States will likely be rebuffed by other strong 
regional actors. By applying U.S. national power in a soft-power centric approach in the 
Next Great Game, the risk and cost is much lower than an overt hard power presence, but 
the reward, as seen in the Gorbachev example, can be high. 
It is important to understand the role that soft power can play, as the use of hard 
power alone can also have unintended repercussions. For example, Nye was very vocal 
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against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. According to Nye, U.S. leaders did not consider 
the use of soft power or the implications that hard power acts can have on soft power 
resources. Aside from disregarding soft power as useful in helping to form a coalition, 
Nye argues that the unilateral application of hard power diminished American’s 
international appeal and significantly eroded its ability to use soft power in the future.48 
Furthermore, by ignoring soft power, the United States’ actions in Iraq can be seen as 
failing to understand what Nye describes as a “complex three-dimensional chess 
game.” 49 The top level (composed of political-military issues) and the middle board 
(consisting of economic power) are very much hard power concerns; however, the 
bottom board (involving transnational relations) is in constant flux, and hard power alone 
is often inadequate and/or inappropriate. The bottom board requires soft power because 
the issues that are played at that level require multilateral solutions.50 In this comparison, 
the United States may have won on one or two levels, but it failed to consider all the 
levels of power and ultimately lost in what Nye called, “a profound misunderstanding of 
the nature of power in world politics.”51  
Prior to what Nye refers to as the information age, an age beginning roughly at the 
dawn of the Twenty-first Century, there are instances where hard power alone has been 
used successfully. 52  One such application would be the formation of an alliance to 
achieve a focused military objective, such as the Allies in World War II. In this case, 
although the Allies did form a successful alliance to defeat the Axis Powers, they did not 
always have a foundation with each other that was reinforced by soft power. However, it 
is important to note that on the micro scale, soft power played a notable role in the 
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mobilization of the public within each nation, but on the macro level, the soft power 
bonds between the United States and the Soviet Union were sparse.53 This made the U.S. 
partnership with the Soviet Union fleeting. The reason the Allies fell apart, or more 
accurately why the Soviet Union withdrew from the alliance, is because that alliance—or 
any alliance based on strictly hard power concerns—was based on the military situation 
at the time. In an alliance based strictly on hard power considerations, once the situation 
changes, it is difficult to foresee if the partnership will remain in place. In this case, once 
Nazi Germany was eliminated, the differing geopolitical agendas and the superficiality of 
the socially constructed wartime views of the United States and the Soviet Union quickly 
tore the alliance apart.  
From the start, President Roosevelt disliked the authoritarian Soviet regime and 
did not trust its motives. He even placed what he called a “moral embargo” on certain 
items exported to the Soviet Union as part of the lend-lease program. Though President 
Roosevelt understood that Nazi Germany was the greater enemy at the time, the president 
compared the alliance with the Soviet Union to “hold[ing] hands with the devil.”54 As 
Frank Capra, the leading director of American propaganda films during World War II 
later said in an interview, “We had a political problem with Russia … The problem was 
that a hell of a lot of people on our side were not about to be sold a bill of goods by the 
Communists. We were their allies, but that was all.”55 Both Roosevelt and Capra knew 
that the American people were not going to and, in fact, did not have to like the Soviets to 
form an effective military alliance. The same was also true from the Soviets’ perspective, 
as they saw the United States as corrupted by capitalistic greed and considered U.S. 
foreign involvement to be a form of economic imperialism. 56 Therefore, the uneasy 
alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States was a means to an end, and once 
                                                 
53 R.J. Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996).   
54 “US-Soviet Alliance, 1941–1945,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed 
October 27, 2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/us-soviet.  
55 Leland Poague, ed., Frank Capra Interviews (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2004), 
125. 
56 Jackson Spievelvogel, Western Civilization: Volume II: Since 1500 (Stamford, CT: Cengage 
Learning, 2009), 862–864. 
  20 
that end was achieved, the relationship could not last. However, even this style of alliance 
is increasingly difficult to create in the information age without the bonds of soft power. 
Outside the purpose of this thesis, but nonetheless important to consider, would be any 
possible correlation between this alliance and the current alliance forming to fight the 
Islamic State. 
The World War II alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union was 
thus based on hard power alone because neither country was amenable to or attracted to 
the other’s soft power. For soft power to be effective, the host nation must be receptive. 
Compare the relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States to that with Great 
Britain and the United States following World War II. The United States and Britain 
formed a meaningful alliance based on both their alignment at the geopolitical level and 
similar (relatively speaking) social and cultural views. These bonds held together even 
after the fall of Nazi Germany and became the foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), which ironically stood in direct opposition to the Soviet Union 
following the war. In this way, it can be seen that the bonds created by soft power helped 
build the Anglo-American “special relationship,” a relationship that has an ability be 
transposed onto various situations. The special U.S.-British relationship remains more or 
less in place to this day. It is important to keep this in mind when discussing a possible 
U.S. partnership with India explored in the chapters to come. 
B. FINDING A RECEPTIVE AUDIENCE 
When seeking to identify a receptive audience, it is important to consider that 
certain civilizations may present themselves inherently more receptive to U.S. soft power. 
For this purpose, useful works are Samuel Huntington’s Foreign Affairs article, “The 
Clash of Civilizations” and book of the same name.57 In these works, Huntington writes 
that the world is broken into several civilizations, as depicted in Figure 3.58 
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Figure 3.  Major Civilizations According to Huntington 
 
Source: Wikipedia, s.v., “Clash of Civilizations,” accessed October 26, 2015, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations#cite_note-8. Original image can be 
found in Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order (New 
York: Touchstone 1997), 26–27. 
By exploring Huntington’s work, the purpose is not to argue for or against his 
findings but rather to explore the analysis he conducted as it pertains to identifying the 
boundaries of different civilizations and the general trends that can be inferred from these 
boundaries. 
When considering the key players in the Next Great Game, we can see that in the 
background four separate civilizations are vying for regional dominance. This is a key 
consideration when exploring where soft power can prove effective, as each civilization 
views the United States through a unique lens. This is useful when analyzing a recent 
Pew Research poll of global perception of the United States, as depicted on the map in 
Figure 4.  
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Figure 4.  Global Opinion of the United States 
 
Source: Max Fisher, “Who Loves and Hates America: A Revealing Map of Global 
Opinion toward the U.S.,” Washington Post, January 11, 2013, accessed August 3, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/01/11/who-loves-and-hates-
america-a-revealing-map-of-global-opinion-toward-the-u-s/. 
Of the four key nations in consideration, the researchers in a 2015 Pew Research 
Poll asked the citizens of these countries whether they had a favorable, unfavorable, or 
neutral perception of the United States. The results are shown as an average of the 
responses given by the population within the stated nation:  
• Iran: no information available.  
• Russia: 15 percent favorable, 81 percent unfavorable; a net of 66 
percentage points unfavorable. 
• India: 70 percent favorable, eight percent unfavorable; a net of 62 
percentage points favorable.  
• China: 44 percent favorable, 49 percent unfavorable; a net of 5 percentage 
points unfavorable.59  
The results are telling. If attraction is the key to soft power, as laid out by Nye, 
then the greater the positive perception of the United States is, the greater the probability 
                                                 
59 Pew Research Center, “Global Indicators Database,” last modified in spring 2105, accessed August 
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of attraction. The results of this poll are even more telling when overlaid onto 
Huntington’s civilizations map, focusing on the four key nations of the Next Great Game, 
as seen in Figure 5. 
Figure 5.  Global Opinion of the United States along Civilizational Lines 
 
This map was created by the author by overlaying Huntington’s map, and the results of 
the Pew Research Poll map. Adapted from Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: 
Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone 1997); Pew Research Center, “Global 
Indicators Database,” last modified in Spring 2105, accessed August 5, 2015, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/survey/17/response/Unfavorable/map/. 
This is useful as it appears that to a greater or lesser degree, the overall perception 
of the United States and therefore the expected effectiveness of its soft power, seemingly 
falls along civilizational lines. Not surprisingly, the strongest positive perception is found 
among Western nations; however, a closer examination of the four key nations of the 
Next Great Game reveals much. Of the four states that most negatively view the United 
States, all of them are within the Islamic civilization, which includes Iran and Pakistan. 
Perception is only slightly better in the Sinic civilization (China), and Orthodox (Russia) 
is just a few percentage points higher but is still a net negative. Last, but not least, the 
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Hindu civilization (consisting only of India) exhibits a highly positive perception of the 
United States.  
This information is useful, not only for finding out where there is a significant 
positive perception of the United States, but also where there are “swing civilizations.” 
As previously discussed, Huntington divided the globe into two main categories: “the 
West,” and, “the Rest.” 60  However, there were a few exceptions that Huntington 
identified as being able to go to either way. India is one of those swing civilizations.61 
This is important to consider not only because of India’s current/future role in 
geopolitics, as discussed in the previous chapter, but also because of the high potential for 
soft power to continue to be and increase being embraced by India. Much of this 
attraction has to do with numerous commonalities between India and the Unites States. 
These commonalties, if properly understood, can provide a firm foundation for a 
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III. THE SEEDS OF A U.S. SOFT POWER APPROACH TO INDIA
When exploring where U.S. soft power may prove effective, a good starting point 
is finding a receptive audience based on a positive perception of the United States, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. This has helped to identify India (with a 70 percent 
favorable perception of the United States) as a likely recipient of U.S. soft power among 
the powerbrokers in the Next Great Game. However, further analysis using Nye’s 
attributes of soft power (domestic values, culture, and foreign policy) uncovers much 
more. The purpose of this chapter is to explore what commonalities there are between the 
United Sates and India that serve to form soft power bonds based on these attributes. To 
do this, the first part of the chapter explores the role that a common British ancestry 
played in shaping the domestic values that India and the United States share today. Next, 
this chapter explores shared cultural attributes between the United States and India by 
examining the influence of the American film industry. In addition, this chapter uncovers 
some common soft power themes that lay in both U.S. and Indian foreign policy. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to show that many common values are shared by both the United 
States and India and that these shared attributes provide significant soft power reserves. 
A. INDIAN DOMESTIC VALUES: A LEGACY OF THE BRITISH 
When exploring what commonalities may exist between the United States and 
India, it is useful to explore the respective histories of each nation. When doing so, the 
dominant shared experience is that both the United States and India were once colonies 
under the British Crown. In this next section, this thesis will briefly review Indian history 
as a British colony, and in doing so, uncovers several soft power seeds that currently 
serve to create soft power bonds between India and the United States. 
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1. Common Language 
Western influence on the subcontinent can be traced back to the British and the 
East India Company in the 1600s.62 Though technically a private company, the East 
Indian Company was under a royal charter, and as a result, the British monarchy 
exercised indirect control over the company. At the time, the British were in fierce 
competition in both south and east Asia with other European powers seeking to expand 
their respective influence along the Silk Road. Interests clashed in 1757 during the Battle 
of Plassey, in which the privately operated English East India Army won a decisive battle 
against the Mughals and their French allies. As a result of the battle, the English East 
India Company assumed all administrative functions over more and more territory over 
the next century until 1857, when a major revolt necessitated the intervention of the 
British Army. After extinguishing what was called the Sepoy Rebellion (or the Great 
Mutiny) in 1858, the British Crown used the intervention to replace the English East 
India Company with the British Raj. India was now the under direct rule of the British 
Crown, with Queen Victoria taking the title of the Empress of India.63 
A quick analysis of British rule of India gives some indication as to why India is 
or can be receptive to U.S. soft power today. By assuming full administrative control 
over India in 1858, the British made English the language of government in the Indian 
Empire. While English is not as widely used in India as it is in the United States today, it 
remains the official language of both governments (even though Indian English and 
American English are different in various ways). Having a shared language helps to 
ensure that certain nuances and connotations are not quite literally lost in translation and 
is useful to ease the spread of such American cultural influencers as music or movies. 
The importance of a shared language in creating a receptive audience for American music 
and film is noteworthy and will be addressed again later in this chapter. 
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2. Concerns over Taxes and Representation 
After the World War I, the British increased their taxation on the Indian people to 
help offset the cost of the war. This served to increase Indian resentment and fomented 
several protests, such as those that led to the Amritsar massacre in 1919. 64  British 
attempts to quell the unrest through violence only caused more agitation. Eventually, the 
British relented and agreed to some of the Indian demands through the passing of the 
Government of India Act in 1935. This act, passed by the British Parliament, introduced 
limited political autonomy to the Indian Empire.65  
Several similarities can be drawn from this quick snapshot in time. Both the 
Indian Empire and the colonies that formed the United States faced many of the same 
issues while under the Crown. Both native populations rejected the imposition of taxes 
and other administrative duties by what was being increasingly seen as a foreign 
occupying force. The reaction of the British to attempt to squash any rebellion with 
violence, whether in Boston in 1770 or in the Punjab in 1919, only served to create more 
resistance and foment future unrest.  
3. The Role of Law 
A notable similarity, created by the passing of the Government of India Act in 
1935, was that India adopted an English style of law. The act divorced the Indian judicial 
system from the duty of the British governors and shifted more responsibility onto 
provincial governments headed by Indians. 66 This resulted in India developing a judicial 
system based on an English common law system, as in the United States. As seen in 
Figure 6, only nations that were once under the governance of the British Crown can 
claim this heritage. This is useful because both the United States and India share an 
understanding about the role and implementation of the law, not to be confused with the 
rule of law which is addressed later.  
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Figure 6.  Law Systems around the Globe 
 
Source: “World Map,” University of Ottawa, accessed May 4, 2015, http://www.juri 
globe.ca/eng/rep-geo/cartes/monde.php. 
In addition to leaving behind a case-law system, the British also instilled the 
concept of the rule of law that inspired first the United States and then India to seek 
social equality under the law.67 This idea was so powerful that once India was granted 
independence, Indian lawmakers tried with uneven results to eliminate its ancient caste 
system. In 1947, the Indian constitution put forth article 16, which required “equality of 
opportunity in matters of public employment,” while article 17, enacted the “abolition of 
untouchability,” made it illegal to discriminate based on said caste. 68  In practice 
untouchability and the caste system still operates on a day-to-day basis, although they 
have certainly been weakened. Since then, numerous laws, such as India’s reservation 
policy, have attempted to assist lower caste Indians. Under the reservation policy, a quota 
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system for public jobs was put in place mandating that a certain percentage of jobs go to 
those from historically lower castes. This process has been compared to affirmative 
action laws within the United States.69  
4. Type of Government 
While the passing of the Government of India Act in 1935 was intended to ease 
tensions between the British and the native population, it actually increased hostility 
among a diverse and divided native population. This was especially true for the minority 
Muslim population as they were very fearful of Hindu domination in domestic issues. As 
a result, two major political parties formed with each attempting to consolidate authority. 
The largest party was the Indian National Congress (INC), representing most of the 
Indian Hindu population. The second largest was the Muslim League (ML), which 
represented states with predominantly Muslim populations. Mistrust between the two 
parties was evident from the start, as evidenced in 1940 when the leader of the ML said, 
“Muslims and Hindus … were irreconcilably opposed monolithic religious communities 
and as such no settlement could be imposed.” 70  Leaders within the INC, such as 
Mahatma Gandhi, urged the Indian Empire to stay intact until a peaceful resolution could 
be reached. In 1940, during an all India Congress Committee meeting in Bombay, Gandhi 
took the opportunity to voice his concerns, “It is worse than anarchy to partition a poor 
country like India whose every corner is populated by Hindus and Muslims living side by 
side. It is like cutting up a living body into pieces. No one will be able to tolerate this 
plain murder.”71 
Following World War II, Indian nationalism was at an all-time high, and the 
British will to continue their occupation of India was at an all-time low. Movements led 
by leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi were gaining momentum. Gandhi’s call for Britain 
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to “quit India” became the rallying cry of the INC. This sentiment was punctuated with 
mutinies within the Royal Indian Navy and British Indian Army. These mutinies served 
to not only demonstrate a strong desire for Indian autonomy, but they also required 
British regulars to suppress. These issues were compounded for the British by numerous 
incidents of growing violence between the Muslim and Hindu populations, which also 
required British military assets to restore order.72 In turn, this would force more British 
troops to remain engaged in India well after the conclusion of World War II. Members of 
the British public would soon grow tired of having their servicemen overseas, and as 
violence in India escalated, so did the fervency of the public’s call for the return of their 
servicemen.73 The British, exhausted by World War II, decided in 1946 that they would 
formally and quickly end British control in India by 1947.74 
A noteworthy soft power theme from this period is that both the United States and 
India underwent a social equality awakening, as previously described, which led to a 
revolution against British control and to ultimately establish a democratic government. 
Both the United States and India established their governments as democracies once 
given independence, with the latter gaining much inspiration from the U.S. 
Constitution.75 This is important when considering the theory of the democratic peace, 
which surmises that, generally, democracies do not fight each other since they have more 
in common than whatever momentary differences they may have in relation to a specific 
issue. 76  Therefore, according to this logic, democracies find it more beneficial to 
cooperate and are more likely to try and work out their differences peacefully. This 
theory is debated, and while it is outside the purpose of this thesis to make a claim in this 
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debate, the point that the United States and India have a similar style of democratic 
government is noteworthy and provides a powerful soft power bond. 
5. The Role of Government 
The Indian Independence Act of 1947 was intended to cut all legislative ties 
between the Indian Empire and the United Kingdom; however, how this was to be done 
was to shape the nature of conflict in the region for decades. The British wanted to hastily 
resolve the hostility between the Muslims and the Hindus so they could quicken their 
own departure. The plan the British crafted called for the partition of the Indian Empire 
into two states. The first state, India, was to fall under control of the Indian governor 
general (appointed by the Crown) and the INC. The second state, Pakistan, was to fall 
under the Pakistani governor general (also appointed by the Crown) and the ML. The 
military was to be divided based on geographical location, which gave India roughly two-
thirds of the army and Pakistan just one third. Lastly, the Princely States broke all ties 
with Britain and the Indian Empire and were granted autonomy to choose whether to be 
added into India, Pakistan, or to remain independent, though many of them were rolled 
into India by the INC.77  
This set the stage for the ongoing Kashmir conflict. While most of the Princely 
States typically voted along religious lines, with Hindu populations electing to join India 
and Muslim populations with Pakistan, a few states decided not to join either. This was 
usually the case when the political leadership represented a minority of the population. 
Such was the case with the large Princely States of Kashmir (majority Muslim governed 
by Hindus), and Hyderabad (majority Hindu run by Muslims).78 On October 22, 1947, 
armed tribal militias from Pakistan invaded Kashmir. These Muslim militias quickly 
crossed the border and were largely welcomed by the Muslim inhabitants. Kashmir state 
militias in border towns had their ramparts overrun and within days a handful of towns 
were now under the control of the Muslim militias. Fearful of these tribal militias, 
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Kashmiri leadership reached out to India for military assistance. The answer from the 
INC was simple, join India and India will support Kashmir. On October 26, the leaders of 
Kashmir formally acceded into India and Kashmir was recognized as a state within the 
Indian nation.79 
Concerning soft power themes, from conversations this author has had with 
Indians educated on the matter, who wish to remain unnamed, since India’s inception two 
strong held beliefs have shaped the course of its foreign and domestic policy. Both of 
which can be seen during the partition period and the conflict that followed. These beliefs 
are partly due to Indians’ British ancestry, but largely due to the interactions with the ML 
and later Pakistan. The first is India’s belief that a nation should not be formed along 
religious and/or ideological lines. This was one of the main arguments against the 
partition of India, which is one of the core disagreements that sparked the 1947 Kashmir 
crises and set the course for Indo-Pak relations. The second belief is that civilians must 
run the government and, particularly, the military. India then and now holds a very strong 
belief about keeping the military out of politics. Indian concern over this issue was later 
reinforced when Pakistan’s government fell to a military coup in 1958 and again in 1977.    
B. INDIAN CULTURE: INFLUENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES 
While the legacy of British law, government, and language planted several soft 
power seeds, further analysis of another aspect of soft power—culture—uncovers 
indications that U.S. soft power is already taking hold. To make this point, this section 
briefly visits a historical example of the exportation of American culture as a method to 
capitalize on U.S. soft power in the Cold War. This section then explores the role of 
movies, both foreign and domestic, in Indian culture. The original purpose of this chapter 
was to explore any cultural similarities between the United States and India. As a result 
of research, however, it became apparent that not only are similarities present, but these 
similarities are largely the result of the exportation of American culture through the use 
of movies. 
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1. Soft Power and the Ability to Export Culture 
U.S. soft power is unique to other nations’ in its extraordinary ability to be 
exported. As stated by Josef Joffe, the publisher-editor of the German magazine Die Zeit, 
in Nye’s Soft Power: 
US culture, low-brow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen 
in the days of the Roman Empire—but with a novel twist. Rome’s and 
Soviet Russia’s cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. 
America’s soft power, though, rules over an Empire on which the sun 
never sets.80 
This thesis is not arguing that that other nations do not export their own soft power—
quite the opposite—but the quote is profoundly useful to describe the incredible reach 
and pervasiveness of U.S. soft power.81 For example, even though the Soviet Union 
pulled out of its allaince with the United States following World War II due to a lack of 
soft power bonds, as described in Chapter II, over time, the pervasivness of U.S. soft 
power still found various ways through the Iron Curtain. This is evidenced by several 
works that discuss the influence of Western rock-n-roll music as a tool to agitate the 
youth under Soviet control.82  
This attraction to American rock music is on full display in Figure 7. In the 
picture, a German border guard sits atop the Berlin Wall carrying an umbrella sporting 
the logo of the American Music Television Channel (MTV)—a channel known for 
playing the music videos of American rock bands—shortly before the wall’s destruction. 
The popularity of Western music was reinforced by the allure of it being forbidden within 
the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, where the Soviet regime was seen as an occupying 
force, this allure created an especially receptive audience. The antiestablishment music of 
                                                 
80 Nye, Soft Power, 11. 
81 Joseph Nye writes repeatedly about the export of soft power by nations other than the United States 
in his works. For specific examples, see Nye’s The Paradox of American Power, 13, Table 1.1 and Soft 
Power, chapter 3, “Others’ Soft Power.” 
82 Such works include: Timothy Ryback. Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, 1954–1988 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1990); Leslie Woodhead, How 
the Beatles Rocked the Kremlin: The Untold Story of a Noisy Revolution (London: Bloomsbury Publishing: 
2013). 
  34 
the 1960s and 1970s played well into the resentment of many under Soviet control. As a 
result, when then Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev loosened the Soviet iron fist by 
enacting Perestroika and Glasnost, an agitated youth movement began to rise first in the 
Eastern Bloc and then all the way to Moscow.83  
Figure 7.  MTV on the Berlin Wall 
 
Source: “MTV’s Revolutionary Hour on the Berlin Wall,” Guardian, November 2, 2009, 
accessed September 2, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/nov/02/mtv. 
While Western music on its own cannot on its own be given credit for the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it certainly played a part and influenced the way people 
behind the Iron Curtain saw the world. In this subtle way, the exportation of American 
culture through film can similarly influence foreign cultures. Concerning American film 
in India, the result may not be as profound as the example above, but it still serves to 
introduce new ideas and help shape what ideals are important to a culture. 
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2. From Hollywood to Bollywood 
America has been the industry leader in film since the early twentieth century.84 
This has made American movies the industry standard and has afforded these movies 
reach while also encouraging emulation. Even with increasing competition in foreign 
markets, American-made films have such an appeal that Hollywood movies consistently 
sell more tickets overseas than in the United States.85 However, Josef Joffe, the German 
editor quoted earlier, was more critical in a later work with regard to the prospect of 
American movies serving as revenue for U.S. soft power. He writes, “Hundreds of 
millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, 
but they do not identify these accouterments of their daily lives with America.”86  
To counter Joffe’s point, this thesis argues as American culture becomes familiar 
with the viewer (through movies), this familiarity breeds emulation. With emulation, as 
select ideas catch on and spread, comes “indigenization.”87 That is, aspects of American 
culture implanted in the viewer slowly become absorbed and are no longer seen as strictly 
American. As this occurs, these aspects become part of the viewer’s culture as well. Once 
that aspect is embedded into a foreign culture, it becomes native and can no longer be 
separated or distinguished as “American.” The true power behind soft power is not that it 
is recognized as American, but rather that it creates common bonds that can serve to align 
socio-cultural norms. Joffe claims, the fact that these once-American influences are no 
longer seen as American, does not diminish these influences as a source of soft power, 
but actually serves to further this point. 
In examining India, one see’s that the Indians’ love of cinema can also be traced 
back to the British. In the 1930s, the British encouraged India to develop the Indian 
Cinematograph Enquiry Committee in an attempt to entice Indian viewers towards 
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English movies over American movies. The result was that Indians developed a greater 
appreciation for film in general. As the Indians on the joint UK-India committee began to 
encourage the making of movies in India rather than relying on importation, the 
committee was disbanded by the British.88 Following India’s independence in 1947, this 
exposure to foreign film and the resulting desire to make movies would lead to an 
explosion within the Indian film industry. Not surprisingly, the golden age of Bollywood 
was from the 1950s through the 1960s. During this era, Indian movie plots were 
seemingly borrowed from films introduced to India during Hollywood’s golden age 
during the 1920–40s. Evidence of emulation can be seen in Indian musicals, as the scenes 
of mass singing and dancing that has become iconic to Indian cinema actually has its 
roots in the American musicals during Hollywood’s golden age before World War II.89  
An example of emulation turning toward indigenization is the 2004 movie Bride 
and Prejudice. This movie, directed by a famous Bollywood director and starring 
numerous Bollywood actors and actresses, had several scenes originally filmed in Hindi. 
The plot of this movie was a loose adaption of Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice and 
featured a Hollywood actor, playing a character named William Darcy (Martin 
Henderson), who was falling in love with a Bollywood actress, playing Lalita Bakshi 
(Aishwarya Rai), who was balancing true love with traditional Indian concepts of 
marriage. What is remarkable is that the protagonist, Darcy, epitomizes the Western ideal 
of true love and individual choice. In contrast, the antagonist, Balraj Bingly, represents 
the traditional Indian caste culture of arranged marriages. Produced jointly by Miramax 
(U.S.) and Pathe Pictures (UK), it was translated into Hindi and released in the U.S., UK, 
and India near simultaneously and grossed nearly three times as much overseas (18 
million U.S. dollars [USD] compared to U.S. domestic sales [6 million USD]).90 The 
success of this film is not surprising as Indian culture has been recently battling with the 
influence of Western “true love” clashing with its traditional view on arranged marriages. 
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This conflict has been reflected in many Indian films, with some movies for and some 
against, the true love ideal.91 
It is also worth noting that not every cultural interaction leads to positive changes. 
This is seen in current Bollywood movies where homosexual jokes have made an unusual 
appearance. In one such movie, a Bollywood actor mistakenly kisses a man, which causes 
him to over-react by dramatically scrubbing out his mouth (mimicking a famous scene 
played by Jim Carey in the Hollywood movie, Ace Ventura). In traditional Indian culture, 
male-male physical interaction is seen as asexual, and it is common to see men holding 
hands. Inadvertently kissing a man would normally be accepted with ambivalence rather 
than a negative over-reaction, but as Indian viewers have become accustomed to 
American squeamishness about male-male physical interaction, they have adopted this 
foreign concept into their culture.92  
Another unintended result has been an increase in rapes in India. While rape was 
being committed by all sides during the troubled partition era, it is also seeing an 
unexpected increase recently.93 This, in part, has been attributed to Indians adopting the 
American ideal of female beauty and the objectification of women as sexual objects, 
which, when imprinted on a society with a checkered past concerning rape, has had the 
unintended result of creating more violent crime.94 Certainly, U.S. soft power cannot be 
blamed as the sole factor behind India’s current rape dilemma, but it is arguably playing 
an amplifying role. While this example, along with the previous one, are not the best 
applications of U.S. soft power, it is evidence that exposure to foreign ideas can have a 
real impact. From speaking with Indian citizens, they are aware of the influence of 
American films, and those individuals resistant to foreign influences term this “cultural 
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invasion.” While this term is a bit more critical of these influences, the process of 
indigenization is the same. 
Aside from its cultural impact, Hollywood has had an effect on the economy of 
both India and the United States. Movies portray images and phrases that resonate with 
viewers. For example, the Coca-Cola logo is one of the most widely recognized logos in 
the world regardless of the language of the nation, and it is common to see Coca-Cola 
signs on any given dusty road throughout the globe. This reach has led to the term “Coca-
Colonization,”95 referring to the product’s appeal and ability to be absorbed into local 
economies. In India, the influence of Hollywood has driven a rise in what Mehta calls 
“cultural merchandise,” these being foreign items that have been introduced through 
American film. An example of such merchandise is evident in the Indian greeting card 
industry. This is because new holidays, such as Valentine’s Day, and the tradition of 
sending cards to celebrate these holidays have been attributed to Hollywood. 96 Even 
more than greeting cards, Hollywood has helped make India a market for American 
goods. Following the end of the Cold War and once India no longer had to remain non-
aligned, American goods that were previously only seen on screen were now available in 
stores and proved to be in high demand.97 
Box office sales also create massive amounts of revenue. According to a 2014 
theatrical statistics summary published by the Motion Picture Association of America, 
even though India has a robust film industry of its own, it ranked fifth in international 
box office markets, totaling $1.7 billion USD in 2014.98 This would suggest that India is 
a very receptive market for American film, and correspondingly, receptive to those ideals 
that are being seen on screen. However, when considering the other powers in the Next 
Great Game and the receptiveness of the audience described earlier, of the top 20 
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international box office markets, seven lie within Asia and eight are within Western 
nations. The only region to see a decrease from 2013 to 2014 was the Middle East and 
Africa. While it may be true that ticket sales are not necessarily indicative of any 
substantive alignment of geopolitical interests with the United States, given the 
information previously discussed about the importance of perception, combined with the 
indicators that help identify where U.S. soft power is proving effective, then movies (and 
movies in India) warrant more consideration. This makes American film a substantial soft 
power factor in south Asia and beyond.  
C. U.S. AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: COMMON THEMES 
While the realm of national foreign policy decisions is typically seen as 
dominated by hard power calculations, soft power can play a very nuanced, yet powerful 
role. One of the greatest outcomes that can be cultivated from U.S. soft power reserves, 
as Nye explains, is the ability to set the global agenda.99 Setting the agenda refers to 
shaping what is acceptable in geopolitics, typically done through the construct of 
international organizations. For instance, if the United States supports an organization 
that claims a certain act or aspiration is unreasonable, based upon the idea that the act is 
harmful to the greater international community, and that organization is seen as 
legitimate by the international community, then a nation seeking said aspiration is 
deterred from attempting it. An example of this would be the recent 2015 United Nations 
Climate Change Conference. As part of the conference, states deliberated about 
voluntarily making choices that may not be in their individual best interests (such as 
incurring additional production costs, or funding other nations to assist in their additional 
production costs in order to limit “harmful” emissions) but did so in under the banner that 
these decisions are for the greater good of the international community.100  
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The attraction to participate in organizations that aspire to the greater good can 
come from many sources and can be compared to the concept of “soft power 
bandwagoning” discussed earlier. For instance, in the case of the Climate Change 
Conference, based upon the opinions given from individual Indians this author spoke 
with, they see the conference as a ploy by industrialized nations seeking to place limits on 
developing nations, such as India. Those viewpoints notwithstanding, India still saw the 
benefit of attending the conference—and possibly aligning with the other attending 
nations—and sent delegates to actively participate.101 The point on this observation is not 
to make comment on the validity of concerns raised in conference, but rather to 
emphasize that such organizations rely heavily on their perception in order to be 
recognized as a valid international powerbroker. Suffice it to say that utilizing soft power 
in such a role is a very difficult process and requires strong like-minded states to be 
meaningful. 
A brief review of the shared U.S. and Indian domestic values discussed previously 
in this chapter provides additional avenues to cultivate other soft power bonds when 
considering foreign policy. Such previously discussed values as the type of government 
and the role of government could prove useful to unite over the ideas of spreading 
democracy or to hedge against hostile theocracies or military dictatorships. However, as 
this next section addresses, while U.S.-Indo relations have been historically weak and at 
times at odds, further analysis of Indian foreign policy reveal several more common 
themes that show promise for future cooperation. Two illustrative examples are reviewed 
next. 
1. The Fight against Sponsored Terrorism 
By the mid-1990s, Pakistan was dangerously close to having a deployable nuclear 
arsenal. So close in fact that India had to believe that Pakistan was already nuclear armed, 
although the first successful test of a Pakistani nuclear device would not occur until 1998. 
This created a dilemma for Pakistan, where if it was seen as nuclear armed, whether or 
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not it was true, it would be treated as nuclear armed. This meant that an Indian first strike 
was a real possibility. Fearing nuclear war, Pakistan developed a new way to fight India. 
In the 1990s, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) began to conduct operations against India. The 
group’s goal was to create an insurgency in the Kashmir region of India, and in 1995, 
Pakistan was heavily sponsoring LeT fighters with funding, intelligence, and a safe haven 
within its borders.102  
The use of the LeT as a state sponsored non-state actor (NSA) provided a 
“reliable proxy” for Pakistan.103 These NSAs were adapted to serve the same objective as 
the former Cold War proxy forces (such as those used against the United States in 
Vietnam and against the Soviets in Afghanistan). For India, this created a dilemma as it 
knew the LeT was sponsored by Pakistan—though Pakistan denied involvement—but 
India could not strike the Pakistani homeland for fear of a nuclear retaliation.104 Instead, 
India was dragged into several years of costly counter-insurgency operations against the 
LeT in the Indian state of Kashmir.  
From discussions with senior Indian military members, the Indian military 
described the Kashmir campaign as a fight for “hearts and minds,” a very similar 
terminology used to describe U.S. counter-insurgency tactics in Iraq from 2004–2007. 
From discussions with other Indian officials, this experience in Kashmir helped to shape 
Indian public opinion strongly against the use of NSAs and specifically religious oriented 
NSAs. More than just a hard power concern, both the United States and India hold strong 
beliefs about freedom of religion, and these are reinforced by a shared concern over 
radical religious terror groups, which could provide a soft power avenue for the United 
States and India to join over. 
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2. The Use and Spread of Nuclear Weapons 
The ongoing conflict in Kashmir between India and Pakistan was drastically 
escalated when Pakistan, retaliating to Indian nuclear tests, was emboldened by the 
successful test of a nuclear weapon of its own in 1998. Pakistan subsequently invaded the 
Kashmir region with nearly 1,000 conventional military soldiers in 1999, in what became 
known as the Kargil War. With tensions at an all-time high and fears of a nuclear war 
imminent, the United Nations was unable to form a cohesive strategy and the United 
States felt compelled to intervene.105 
U.S. intervention might have been the intended outcome of this conflict all along. 
Considering that the balance of power in the region remained unsettled after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, and that both Pakistan and India were vying for U.S. support against 
the other. Pakistan was relying on traditional U.S. support for its claims in Kashmir, 
while India was slowly mending ties with the United States following the end of the Cold 
War. Pakistan was fearful of a growing U.S.-Indo relationship, and “many senior 
Pakistani military officials believe[d] that these same (nuclear) capabilities … served to 
catalyze US diplomatic interest.”106 In this way, the awesome destructive power of a 
nuclear device served not only as a military weapon, but also as an effective weapon to 
leverage international attention. 
This nuclear standoff was deeply unsettling for Indian policy makers. Since then, 
India has re-evaluated the way they think about nuclear weapons, both foreign and 
domestically controlled. According to conversations with senior level officers at the 
Naval War College in Goa, India, India is currently grappling with several nuclear 
concerns. The first is nuclear proliferation, specifically through a NSA. The second 
concern is the use of a nuclear weapon as a first strike option (against them as India has a 
stated “no first use” policy). The third is the use of tactical level nuclear weapons. While 
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these Indian concerns are directed toward Pakistan, and to some extend China, the United 
States shares these concerns almost universally.  
These Indian concerns are part of a larger and very complex topic that this thesis 
encourages future research to study. The history between the United States and India/ 
Pakistan over their respective nuclear programs has been a point of contention on all 
sides and is a topic that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Though this is a difficult and 
contested issue, these concerns highlight what India thinks the role of a nuclear weapon 
should be. These ideas are largely shared by the United States and could be leveraged by 
an international organization to stabilize relations regarding this issue in south Asia and 
beyond. This must be kept in mind as recent developments give promise for increased 
Indian cooperation with the international community in the future, such as: in 2008, when 
India lobbied for and attained a trade waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group to 
conduct trade though India is not signee of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Treaty (NPT) and in 2009, when India agreed to destroy its stockpile of offensive 
chemical weapons.107 These two instances show India’s knowledge and acceptance of 
some form of international community’s normative structure. 
Throughout this chapter, several common soft power bonds have been discussed 
and have been suggested as avenues to cultivate U.S. soft power reserves. However, as is 
addressed in the following chapter, even when an avenue presents itself, soft power may 
show varying degrees of success, depending on the application. This is because it is 
important to understand that U.S. soft power must be adaptive, both to the type of 
relationship being constructed and to the social-cultural norms of the partnered nation.  
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IV. FINAL THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT 
U.S. SOFT POWER 
One of the side effects of the recent growth of Indian national power and 
influence is a sense that a relationship with the United States no longer needs to be 
confined to the framework of an existing U.S.-Pak relationship. That is, if engagements 
are done correctly and with respect to the proper application of hard power and/or soft 
power. From speaking with researchers within the Indian think-tank Observer Research 
Foundation (ORF) in New Delhi, India (all of whom agreed to speak on a condition of 
anonymity), India once had a zero-sum mentality, which persisted through much of the 
1950s and 1970s. However, that view is no longer as stringent, as many Indians believe 
that their relative strength to Pakistan, along with the warming of relations with the 
United States recently, have allowed the United States to engage both India and Pakistan 
simultaneously. However, these engagements must be done in proper balance with 
relation to the use of hard power and soft power. Consider that while Pakistan is a vital 
U.S. ally in the region, their relationship is predicated on hard power concerns. 
Concerning India, the United States has much more soft power reserves that can be 
cultivated to form a closer relationship without necessarily upsetting current partnerships 
or initiating a security competition as discussed earlier. This shift is already occurring, as 
evidenced by the quote from World Affairs: 
With India’s economic rise, fears of Chinese hegemony, and the 
unraveling relationship with Pakistan, the US is now pursuing what 
previously would have been regarded as an asymmetrical foreign policy 
agenda in South Asia. As part of its new Asia-Pacific strategy, the US is 
committed to strengthening India in all major sectors of national 
development, with the hope of making it a global power and a bulwark 
against Chinese influence in Asia. Meanwhile, Washington is looking for 
a minimalist relationship with Pakistan, focused almost exclusively on 
security concerns.108 
                                                 
108 Shehzad Qazi, “Hedging Bets: Washington’s Pivot to India,” World Affairs (November–December 
2012), accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/hedging-bets-
washington%E2%80%99s-pivot-india.  
  46 
While soft power has helped to form the foundation for a deeper relationship with 
India, it is not a universal answer to every U.S. foreign engagement. For the United 
States, each partnership must be evaluated based on the desired outcomes and also by 
what type of relationship is feasible. At times, relationships may present themselves as 
advantageous to the United States as related to a specific hard power objective, and when 
that partner is not receptive to U.S. soft power, the improper implementation of U.S. soft 
power will show negative results. To better explore this concept, the following section 
will explore the repercussions of not understanding the role of soft power in foreign 
relations. 
A. U.S. SOFT POWER AND PAKISTAN 
As was briefly discussed in the opening chapter, the United States and Pakistan 
have had long ties; however, these ties are less about any long-term shared strategic 
objectives and more about a string of U.S. short-term hard power objectives. For 
example, U.S. relations with Pakistan were strained following the Kargil War and 
subsequent military coup that saw General Pervez Musharraf overthrow elected Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999. However, while the United States objected 
to a military coup overtaking a democracy, the events of September 11, 2001 altered the 
nature of U.S.-Pak relations for years to come. Just as the United States needed Pakistan 
as a launch pad to conduct a proxy fight in Afghanistan against the Soviets in 1980s, the 
United States would again turn to Pakistan to facilitate logistical support for a fight 
against the Taliban in the 2000s.  
Whether cooperation with Pakistan was necessary is not a point of discussion this 
thesis wishes to raise, but it is important to acknowledge that this cooperation had an 
effect on U.S. initiatives towards India as once again Pakistan was seen as the principle 
U.S. partner in south Asia. The main point to be derived from this section is that the 
United States’ invasion into Afghanistan was a hard power consideration that overlooked 
many socio-cultural and geopolitical differences between the United States and Pakistan, 
much like the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War 
II. Butt and Schhofield explain:  
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Aspects such as the nuclear proliferation network of A.Q. Khan, the 
informal and alleged contacts between Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) agency and the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and its 
close strategic relationship with China, might suggest that Pakistan 
regularly falls into what is often viewed as an enemy camp. But it is still 
perceived as a key western ally; in a sense, it is absolved of responsibility 
for these actions.109  
This paradox was highlighted when President Bush formalized Pakistan as a 
major non-NATO (MNNA) ally in 2004 while at the same time Pakistan was objecting to 
numerous U.S. led strikes conducted in Pakistan targeting the leaders of Al-Qaeda. The 
benefit of Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States was increased military and 
economic assistance, as well as a shared desire to replace the Taliban with a more Pak-
friendly Afghan government.110 However, the cost for cooperating with the United States 
came at a price for Pakistani leaders since this decision seemed to stand at odds with 
Pakistani core beliefs. As described earlier, the core beliefs of a nation are vital to 
understanding what common bonds exists to cultivate U.S. soft power. Since this 
decision placed two partners together with differing ideals, it created internal friction, 
especially within Pakistan. This internal friction was seen as furious debates within 
Pakistani government circles erupted against Pakistan’s cooperation in a U.S.-led war. 
Many Pakistani senior cabinet officials, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
chief General Mahmud Ahmed, were vehemently against supporting the United States in 
a war against the Taliban. 111  This not only led to significant changes within the 
Musharraf regime but continues to be a source of domestic unrest today.  
This friction makes Pakistan a reluctant U.S. partner, and is what has and will 
limit the U.S.-Pak alliance to a string of short-term partnerships formed along temporarily 
coinciding hard power interests. The friction exists because Pakistan is largely un-
receptive to U.S. soft power, which makes it difficult to form a meaningful soft power 
foundation between the two nations. The reason why Pakistan appears un-receptive is due 
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in great part to a generally unfavorable view of the United States, a view that is 
reinforced by Pakistan’s relationship with a vocal and unabashed anti-American state: 
Iran.112  
Iran and Pakistan have had strong ties since Pakistani independence in 1947. Iran 
was the first nation to formally recognize Pakistan as a sovereign state, and it provided 
Pakistan with aid during its fight with India over Kashmir. This is not surprising since the 
United States supported both the Shah of Iran and Pakistani claims over Kashmir at 
around the same time. However, when the Shah fell and Iran turned adversarial towards 
the United States, Pakistani ties to Iran actually increased. In 1979, Pakistan was the first 
nation to recognize the new regime in Tehran and even gave military aid to Iran during 
the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, diverting some U.S. arms intended for the Afghan mujahedeen 
to Iran, even though Iranian sentiment towards the United States had been made clear.113 
Recently, Pakistan and Iran have been increasing their trade in both value and quantity to 
their highest levels to date. This was made possible by a preferential trade agreement 
signed in 2004. 114  Increased cooperation is currently under consideration through a 
proposed free trade agreement between the two nations. Pakistani Ambassador to Iran, 
Noor Mohammad Jadmani, endorsed the act by emphasizing that Pakistan and Iran share 
many significant soft power bonds by saying, “Religious and cultural commonalities are 
the cause of broadening mutual cooperation with Iran.”115  
Further evidence that Pakistan is leaning toward Tehran and away from 
Washington is evidenced in a 2012 Pew Research poll wherein Pakistani respondents 
reported a 79 percent approval rating of Iran. The next highest approval rating for Iran 
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came from Lebanon at just 39 percent.116 In a similar poll conducted in 2014, the United 
States gained only a 14 percent approval rating from Pakistani respondents, which was 
actually up from a mere 11 percent in 2013.117 This slight increase may be attributed to 
U.S.-led relief efforts in Pakistan following a flood in the Punjab region in September 
2014. This small bump is promising for the United States, but it is likely to decline over 
time without further aid to keep it afloat. These poor numbers would indicate that, as of 
now, Pakistan is not receptive. Therefore, if the audience is not receptive, U.S. soft power 
cannot exist. Without the ties that soft power creates, the U.S.-Pak partnership will 
always be based solely on hard power calculations, and any attempt to cultivate U.S. soft 
power prematurely will result in friction. That is not to say that soft power is not 
important in a hard-power, centric relationship. As was seen in the previously described 
case of the fall of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, soft power can still play a very 
important role in an unreceptive audience; it just may take time to prove fruitful. 
A hard-power, centric partnership is not necessarily an absolute negative, as a 
U.S-Pak relationship based on hard power has and can be useful to further U.S. strategic 
objectives. What it does mean is that a U.S.-Pak relationship must be evaluated through a 
strict hard-power, centric approach with specific and defined hard power objectives. 
Since the relationship will lack a substantive soft power foundation, once the hard power 
objective is achieved, it is difficult to know whether the partnership will last, much like 
the World War II alliance between the U.S. and the USSR as previously discussed. 
B. INDIAN SOFT POWER AND AFGHANISTAN 
Shortly after the United States extended a MNNA alliance to Pakistan, it 
attempted to court India with a proposed MNNA working partnership designation; 
however, this was quickly rejected. The fact that the MNNA working partnership 
designation was declined by India is telling, especially since India had become 
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increasingly engaged in Afghanistan around this time also. The U.S. invasion into 
Afghanistan could have provided India an opportunity to influence outside its immediate 
borders and punctuate its role as a regional powerbroker. 118  India’s strategy in 
Afghanistan focused on: preventing Anti-India terrorism, deterring Pakistani and Taliban 
influences on Afghanistan politics, and projecting India’s regional dominance into 
Central Asia.119 India’s objectives with Afghanistan were largely compatible with those 
of the United States and could have been used to further U.S. strategic interests.  
At the time of the U.S.-led invasion, India had close ties with Afghanistan, 
arguably closer than Pakistan did with Afghanistan.120 However, this relationship was 
based on a soft power foundation, and therefore by suggesting a hard power partnership 
with the United States, the United States was misunderstanding the balance of the forms 
of national power at work. The Afghan-Indo relationship was based on shared cultural 
bonds between Afghanistan and south Asia, a relationship that flourished once the 
conflict of the Durand Line was passed from the Indian Empire to Pakistan.121 These soft 
power bonds were seen in 2001 when the Indian foreign minister traveled to meet the 
Afghan interim government. Instead of arms or food, the Indian representative traveled in 
a plane packed with Bollywood movies that were quickly distributed throughout 
Kabul.122 The successful spread of Indian soft power by way of Bollywood, which has 
been shown to share several similarities with Hollywood, demonstrates the receptiveness 
of Afghanistan towards Indian soft power. This could have been used to the United 
States’ benefit, if the United States had better understood the nature of the relationships. 
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C. INDIA AND CHINA 
The rise of China has created a unique opportunity for the United States with 
relation to a partnership with India. As has been discussed, while U.S. soft power has 
found fertile ground in India, U.S. foreign policy has historically driven a wedge between 
the two nations. Though, with Indian concern over the rise of China, this checkered 
history is willing to be overlooked by the Indians to further a closer Indo-U.S. 
relationship. From conversations this author has had with Indians on the matter, it 
appears that just as the Indians were more fearful of the Japanese and supported Britain 
during World War II, currently Indians are more apprehensive about Chinese intentions 
and are more likely to support the United States in the Next Great Game.123 As addressed 
in S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly’s work, The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: 
An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future:  
The United States and India are enjoying increasingly close relations. This 
represents a transformation of the two countries’ past relationship, which 
was characterized by suspicion and distrust. This change … has resulted 
from a convergence of structural, domestic, and individual leadership 
factors.124 
Many of these “factors” (as Kapur writes) are similar to Nye’s attributes of soft power. 
Therefore, the hard power development created by shared concerns over the rise of China 
does not deter from the importance of soft power; in fact, it reinforces it. It creates the 
opportunity to integrate all the tools of U.S. national power, or as Nye calls it, smart 
power.  
This development can be looked at as similar to the events that formed the Anglo-
American “special” partnership. The Anglo-American relationship started in conflict, but 
that relationship solidified over the shared hard power objective to defeat Nazi Germany. 
However, as the Soviet Union broke away from the greater alliance, the Anglo-American 
alliance remained intact due to a strong soft power foundation. This foundation allowed 
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the partnership to be adapted to address various hard power situations over time. This 
special partnership became the cornerstone of NATO and remains in-tact today, 
outlasting the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the U.S.-Indo relation was 
started in conflict (though admittedly not in direct armed conflict like the Anglo-
American relationship but conflict nonetheless); however, now the U.S.-Indo relationship 
can be formalized over a shared concern over the rise of China. What will make the U.S.-
Indo relationship special are all the aforementioned soft power bonds, much like the 
Anglo-American alliance, that can serve to keep the U.S.-Indo partnership adaptive and 
applicable long after the rise and fall of China.  
D. CONCLUSION 
By reviewing the evidence presented thus far, it is clear that the United States and 
India share several soft power bonds as a result of their respective historic connections to 
British colonialism. This may also be the reason why American movies are having such 
an impact on Indian culture. Through the influence of Hollywood, and subsequently 
Bollywood, and the indigenization process, American films have taken root in India, 
which has increased attraction, improved U.S. perception, and created a receptive 
audience. In turn, this increases U.S. soft power reserves. Next, this thesis has uncovered 
several instances where soft power was either misunderstood or used incorrectly and 
explained why the type relationship is invariably tied to the form of U.S. national power 
that must be exercised. Though at times other U.S. relationships within the region may 
present themselves as advantageous for short-term, hard power gains, ultimately the 
United States must be cognizant of the type of relationship that is presenting itself and 
understand that the tools of government are less important that the form of power being 
exercised. Finally, this thesis explored the role that a rising China may play in catalyzing 
an Indo-American partnership, using soft power as its foundation, and integrating all the 
tools of national power to form smart power. Considering all the evidence presented thus 
far, in conclusion, it cannot be emphasized enough that India should be further explored 
as a potential partner in the Next Great Game.  
 
  53 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
“A Less Gloomy Mood in Pakistan.” Pew Global. August 27, 2014. Accessed June 16, 
2015. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/08/27/a-less-gloomy-mood-in-pakistan/.  
“All-time Worldwide Box Office Grosses.” Box Office Mojo. Accessed November 10, 
2014. http://boxofficemojo.com/alltime/world/. 
Ansari, Ali M. Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next 
Great Crisis in the Middle East. New York: Basic Books, 2007. 
Atlantic Community. “Joseph Nye on Soft Power after Iraq.” Accessed October 27, 2015. 
http://www.atlantic-community.org/index.php/Global_Must_Read_Article/ 
Joseph_Nye_on_Soft_Power_After_Iraq. 
Barnds, William. India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers. New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1972. 
Berger, Mark T., and Heloise Weber. Rethinking the Third World: International 
Development and World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
Bertsch, Gary, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava. Engaging India: U.S. Strategic 
Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy. New York: Routledge, 1999. 
Borer, Douglas A. Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared. 
Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999. 
Brzeziński, Zbigniew and Robert M. Gates, and Suzanne Maloney. Iran: Time for a New 
Approach. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004. 
Business Standard. “Clinton Imposes Full Sanctions on India.” May 14, 1998. 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/specials/clinton-imposes-full-sanctions-
on-india-198051401086_1.html. 
Butt, Usama, and Julian Schhofield. Pakistan: The U.S., Geopolitics and Grand 
Strategies. London: Pluto Press, 2012. 
Chari, P. R. “Indo-US Relations: Non-proliferation Concerns.” In Engaging India: U.S. 
Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy, edited by Gary K. 
Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, 3–23. London: Routledge, 
1999. 
Chase, Robert, Emily Hill, and Paul M. Kennedy. The Pivotal States: A New Framework 
for U.S. Policy in the Developing World. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. 
  54 
Cooley, Alexander. Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central 
Asia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
Crime in India: 2012. National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Government of India. Accessed December 9, 2015. http://ncrb.nic.in/CD-
CII2012/Statistics2012.pdf. 
Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2014. 
———. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012. 
Edwardes, Michael. The Last Years of British India. London: Cassell, 1963. 
Fay, Peter. The Forgotten Army: India’s Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942–1945. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993. 
Fisher, Max. “Iran is Popular in Pakistan, Overwhelmingly Disliked Everywhere Else.” 
Washington Post, January 11, 2013. Accessed June 16, 2015. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/01/11/iran-is-
popular-in-pakistan-overwhelmingly-disliked-everywhere-else/. 
Fisher, Max. “Who Loves and Hates America: A Revealing Map of Global Opinion 
toward the U.S.” Washington Post, January 11, 2013. https://www.washington 
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/01/11/who-loves-and-hates-america-a-
revealing-map-of-global-opinion-toward-the-u-s/. 
Dore Gold, Dore. The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West. New York: 
Regnery Publisher, 2009. 
Hackett, James. The Military Balance 2012: The Annual Assessment of Global Military 
Capabilities and Defense Economics. London: Routledge for the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012.  
Hanauer, Larry, and Peter Chalk. India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: 
Implications for the United States and the Region. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2012. 
Hassner, Pierre. “Gorbachev and the West.” Washington Quarterly 11, no. 4 (1988): 95–
103. DOI 10.1080/0163660880947750. 
Harvey, Fiona  and Kim Willsher. “Paris Climate Summit: World Leaders Told to Iron 
out Difference before Talks End.” Guardian. November 28, 2015. Accessed 
December 9, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/28/paris-
climate-summit-world-leaders-talks-france. 
  55 
Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations.” Foreign Affairs (summer 1993). 
———. The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone, 
1997.  
“India.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed December 9, 2015. http://www.nti.org/ 
country-profiles/india/nuclear/. 
Jain, Manju. Narratives of Indian Cinema. Delhi: Ratna Sagar P. Ltd., 2009. 
Joffe, Josef. “The Perils of Soft Power.” New York Times Magazine. May 14, 2006. 
Kaplan, Robert. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New 
York: Random House, 2010. 
Kapur, S. Paul, and Sumit Ganguly. “The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations.” Asian 
Survey 47, no. 4 (2007): 642–656. http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ 
Kapur_Transformation_of_U.S._India_Relations.  
Kux, Dennis. India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991. 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992. 
Lapierre, Dominique and Larry Collins. Freedom at Midnight. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1997.  
MacKenzie, Compton. Eastern Epic, Vol. 1. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1951. 
Mazmudar, Bharati. Gandhi on Partition. Mumbai: Mani Bhavan Gandhi Sangrahalaya, 
2002. Accessed June 15, 2015, http://www.gandhi-manibhavan.org/ 
gandhicomesalive/ebks/gandhionpartition.pdf.  
Mckay, George A. “Consumption, Coca-colonisation, Cultural Resistance—and Santa 
Claus.” In Christmas, Ideology and Popular Culture, edited by Jean Wilson, 50–
58. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008. 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Rev. ed. New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2014. 
Mehta, Rini Bhattacharya, and Rajeshwari V. Pandharipande. Bollywood and 
Globalization: Indian Popular Cinema, Nation, and Diaspora. New York: 
Anthem Press, 2010. 
Ministry of Law and Justice. “The Constitution of India.” Accessed October 27, 2015. 
http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%202Pg.Rom8Fsss(6).pdf. 
  56 
Mistry, Dinshaw. “Complexity of Deterrence among New Nuclear States.” In Complex 
Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age edited by T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, 
and James J. Wirtz, 183–203. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.  
“MTV’s Revolutionary Hour on the Berlin Wall.” The Guardian. November 2, 2009. 
Accessed September 2, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/nov/ 
02/mtv. 
Naik, J.A. Soviet Policy towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev. Delhi: Vikas 
Publication, 1970.  
National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (NIC 2012-001). 
Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2012. 
The Numbers. “Bride & Prejudice (2005).” Accessed November 10, 2014. 
http://www.the-numbers.com/movie/Bride-and-Prejudice#tab=summary. 
Nye, Joseph. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: 
Basic Books, 1990. 
———. “The Decline of America’s Soft Power.” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2004). 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-
americas-soft-power.  
———. “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power.” Foreign Affairs (July–August 
2009). Accessed October 27, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-
07-01/get-smart. 
———. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 
2004. 
Omissi, David. “India and the Western Front.” BBC. Last modified March 3, 2011. 
Accessed October 27, 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/ 
wwone/india_wwone_01.shtml. 
Overy, R. J. Why the Allies Won. New York: W.W. Norton, 1996. 
“Pakistan Offers Iran to Sign Free Trade Agreement.” Tehran Times. April 29, 2015. 
Accessed June 17, 2015. http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp? 
code=246412.  
Pant, Harsh V. India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implications. 
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012.  
Pew Research Center. “Global Indicators Database.” Last modified in Spring 2015. 
Accessed August 5, 2015. http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/survey/ 
17/response/Unfavorable/map/. 
  57 
Poague, Leland. Frank Capra Interviews. Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 
2004. 
“Preferential Trade Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.” Accessed June 15, 2015. http://www.commerce.gov.pk/ 
PIPTA/Pak-Iran_Preferential_Trade_Agreement.pdf.  
Qazi, Shehzad. “Hedging Bets: Washington’s Pivot to India.” World Affairs (November–
December 2012). Accessed October 1, 2015. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/ 
article/hedging-bets-washington%E2%80%99s-pivot-india. 
Rosenthal, Albert J. and Louis Henkin. Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of 
the United States Constitution Abroad. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990. 
Ryback, Timothy. Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, 1954–1988. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1990. 
Schwartz, Bernard. The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of 
Rights. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002. 
Shah, Mehtab Ali. The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethical Impacts on Diplomacy, 1974–
1994. London: I. B. Taurus, 1997. 
Shah, Saeed, Adam Entous, and Gordon Lubold. “U.S. Threatens to Withhold Pakistan 
Aid.” Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2015. Accessed October 1, 2015. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-threatens-to-withhold-pakistan-aid-1440163925. 
Siegel, Richard L. Evaluating the Results of Foreign Policy: Soviet and American Efforts 
in India. The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International 
Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs, 6. Denver: University of Denver 
Press, 1969. 
Simon, Steven and Johnathon Stevenson. “The End of Pax American: Why Washington’s 
Middle East Pullback Makes Sense.” Foreign Affairs. (November–December 
2015). 
Sklar, Robert. Movie-Made America. Toronto: Random House, 1975. 
Slazman, Andrew. “Presidential Visit Buoy US-India Business Relationships.” India 
Briefing. January 29, 2015. Accessed October 1, 2015. http://www.india-
briefing.com/news/india-target-increased-bilateral-cooperation-obama-state-visit-
9897.html/.  
Special Operations Command Pacific. “Mission.” Accessed August 9, 2014. 
http://www.socpac.socom.mil/default.aspx. 
  58 
Spievelvogel, Jackson. Western Civilization: Volume II: Since 1500. Stamford, CT: 
Cengage Learning, 2009. 
Stokes, Bruce. “How Indians See the World.” Pew Global. September 17, 2015. 
Accessed December 7, 2015. http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/09/17/the-modi-
bounce/india-report-05/ 
Talbot, Ian, and Gurharpal Singh. The Partition of India. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.  
Tankel, Stephen. Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects. Washington, 
DC: New America Foundation, 2011. 
Thapar, Romila, and Thomas George Percival Spear. A History of India. Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, 1965. 
“Theatrical Market Statistics 2014.” Motion Picture Association of America. March 
2015. Accessed October 1, 2015. http://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/03/MPAA-theatrical-Market-Statistics-2014.  
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. “U.S.-Soviet Alliance, 1941–1945.” 
Accessed October 27, 2015. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/us-
soviet. 
Wallbank, Walter T. The Partition of India: Causes and Responsibilities. Boston: DC 
Heath, 1966.  
Weisskopf, Thomas. Affirmative Action in the United States and India: A Comparative 
Perspective. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
White House. National Security Strategy. Washington, DC: White House, 2010. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strat
egy.pdf. 
———. National Security Strategy. Washington, DC: White House, 2015. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strat
egy.pdf. 
Wike, Richard, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter. “America’s Global Image.” Pew 
Global. Accessed August 3, 2015.  http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/1-
americas-global-image/. 
Woodhead, Leslie. How the Beatles Rocked the Kremlin: The Untold Story of a Noisy 
Revolution. London: Bloomsbury Publishing: 2013.  
  59 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
